

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

November 17, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

Over the last few months there have been increasing references to a Control and Inspection System which I first presented about four years ago, and I note that now the North Atlantic Council is again taking an active interest in this subject. Since the references may attract your interest, I am inclosing herewith the two basic documents: one a message to the Standing Group for the Council, Nr. SH 40405, SHAPTO 1492, dated 20 June 1957; and the other an unaddressed memorandum of March 1958, which amplifies the proposal contained in the earlier message. Copies of this memorandum were given to Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Dulles, at their request.

In looking over these papers I note that some changes might be made to bring them up to date but, in general, they seem to explain the proposal satisfactorily. However, in the light of developments over the period of the last year, I would clearly emphasize the importance of the area in Europe being extended to include one or more countries other than the Federal Republic on the Western side. In order to further eliminate any appearance of discrimination against the Federal Republic, I would propose that the plan be extended to include some part of the United States, Alaska, for instance, in exchange for an equivalent area of the Soviet Union.

This Control and Inspection Plan was explained to Chancellor Adenauer in May of 1960, at which time his reaction was unfavorable. Although he may have disapproved the idea in principle in any case, I believe that his disapproval was

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conditioned by the rather distorted briefing he appeared to have received prior to my meeting with him as well as by the fact that he was even at that time concerned with the coming election in the Federal Republic.

Yours faithfully,

2 Incls:

1-Cy msg SH 40405
SHAPTO 1492, 20 Jun 57
2-Cy Memo, Mar 1958


LAURIS NORSTAD
General USAF

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

The current positions of the United States and its Allies regarding disarmament, the reunification of Germany, and related security questions are morally and practically sound and should not be lightly abandoned in response to the propaganda pressures of the Soviet Union or the first impact of those pressures on certain of our Allies. For reasons of both substance and tactics we should, in the first instance, try to get maximum mileage from our current positions, especially in stressing the prospects in the European security field that would be opened up in the context of a reunified Germany presumably oriented to the West. We would assume, therefore, that in the early stages of any negotiations with the Soviets, whether through normal diplomatic channels or in meetings of Foreign Ministers or Heads of Government, we would put forward proposals falling within the framework of positions to which we have hitherto adhered, perhaps improving them from the viewpoint of simplicity and clarity for more effective public impact.

However, for reasons having to do with the internal politics of several of our Allies, it may be necessary for the West to have in reserve the possibility of a fresh proposal if we are to emerge from another round of negotiations with the Soviets with unimpaired NATO unity.

II

Any such proposal must satisfy the following criteria:

(a) It should strike public opinion everywhere, and more especially in the West and the so-called uncommitted areas, as a forward-looking easily understandable first step toward the easing of cold-war tension. Acceptability to the Soviets should be only a tertiary consideration.

(b) It should not prejudice our present position on German reunification or imply de facto recognition of the East German regime; likewise it should not prejudice our continuing to press for the acceptance of the proposals put forward by the West in the disarmament talks in London last summer.

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(c) At the same time it should not depend on acceptance by the other side of our proposals relating to Germany or disarmament.

(d) It should contain no provisions which would cause either East or West to fear a one-sided sacrifice of any essential elements of its security and should deliberately be framed to avoid any change in the basic power balance between the West and the U.S.S.R. at this stage.

(e) It should, therefore, be capable of standing alone and have a certain intrinsic value in abating tensions without being formally tied to further progress.

(f) Nevertheless, it should be a project which if it is found workable in practice over a period of time could be said to lay the groundwork both practically and psychologically for a wider detente in the future.

III

In 1957 when the North Atlantic Council was considering the disarmament proposals made at London, it expressed a desire to consider General Norstad's views on possible establishment of a system of arms inspection and control in the European area. He transmitted these views to the Standing Group on June 20th, 1957. That message stated in part:

"The reduction of force levels introduces negotiating and administrative complexities and difficulties of considerable magnitude. It is my view that an effective, although first-step, system can be designated which would be based on acquiring accurate knowledge of forces, rather than on achieving their reduction. Reduction of force levels in this particular area would appear to belong in a later stage of the disarmament process."

It would seem that this suggestion of a modest step towards arms inspection and control, independent of larger, more controversial plans, would satisfy the criteria listed above for an acceptable fresh initiative. Furthermore, details would be:

(a) That the minimum area for ground inspection should comprise Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia (the "Rapacki Plan" area, as it happens);

(b) That aerial inspection should be provided for, and should cover an area not less than that covered by ground inspection;

(c) That overlapping radar arrangements should be included;

(d) That, because of the extreme difficulty of determining the amount and location of nuclear material and components, the inspection and control of nuclear weapons should be concentrated on delivery means and vehicles.

IV

Other general features of this first-step proposal for arms inspection and control merit mention:

(a) Scope and Object of Inspection. An exchange of "blue prints" covering all military installations and deployment of forces within the area would be the initial step. The purpose of inspection in the first instance would be to verify the exchange of blue prints. Thereafter, it would be to provide warning of preparations for armed attack. As this would involve movements of forces within the area, there would need to be a continuing exchange of advance information as to movements, which could be verified by inspection procedures. Changes in the situation disclosed by aerial inspection could also be checked by mobile teams. The teams should make agreed periodic reports, as well as spot reports on any matters affecting their mission. They should have their own line of communication and communications system. They should be allowed complete mobility within the area without need to seek permission or provide advance information. They should not be permitted to make technical inspections of equipment within the area nor to have access to

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buildings, vehicles or dumps where nuclear warheads are stored. However, such locations should be identified in the exchange of blue prints, and movements into and out of such locations could be observed and reported by the inspecting teams. While otherwise the teams would have full access to all military installations, depots, ports, harbors, rail centers, roads, airfields, and missile launching sites within the area, this would not include the right of entry into dwellings or buildings purportedly private in character.

(b) Size of inspection group. 100% reliable inspection is impossible, and to attempt to approach it by seriously considering several thousand inspectors for each side would be unrealistic and would prejudice the chances of gaining acceptance of the proposal. Initially about 3,000 inspectors in all (1,500 representing each side) would be as many as could be tolerated in the control area. While this number of inspectors obviously could not assure the giving of a warning as fully as could a larger number, they could presumably cover all airfields, major installations and key points. Personnel needed to support aerial photographic inspection would be in addition to this number and would presumably be based outside the area. Furthermore, those required to operate the over-lapping radar installations would also be in a separate category.

(c) Nature of the inspection teams. Inclusion of official representatives from the governments and regimes in the control area would mean dignifying the East German regime and probably stressing the division of Germany. Settling for representatives from NATO and the Warsaw Pact as "corporate" organizations would equate NATO with the Warsaw grouping, an undesirable concession. A UN solution seems more nearly acceptable, although it is highly questionable if the NATO nations would like having their security contingent upon the effectiveness, impartiality,

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and promptness of some inspector from, say, Afghanistan or Egypt. Most promising solution of all, which might actually prove readily acceptable to all concerned and could conceivably also be arranged under UN auspices, would be to have mixed U.S. and Soviet teams operating throughout the entire inspection area. This would have the considerable merit of avoiding the politically undesirable step of "recognizing" the present de facto boundary between East and West Germany. The operational procedures for these mixed teams and the nature of the reports they would make would, of course, require careful consideration. The Soviet and U.S. sections of the various teams would be formally linked only at the top by a system of co-commanders and that the sections would be able to make frequent "operational" reports to their respective military superiors, perhaps to CINCEUR in the case of the U.S. side. Though there might be devised a workable procedure for joint reports at given intervals to the appropriate UN organ, it would probably be prudent to assure that here too separate reports could be transmitted. Provision would also have to be made for situations in which, for example, the U.S. element wished to carry through a given inspection visit and the Soviet element took a procrastinating attitude. The best rule here would seem to be a procedure under which each section had the duty of inviting the other side, but no obligation to hold up an inspection if the other side chose not to come along.

V

The foremost military advantage to this first-step proposal for arms inspection and control is that the danger of surprise attack, especially on the ground, would be reduced, and increased security as to surprise air attack would also be achieved. Also, and unlike the "Rapacki Plan" and certain "disengagement" proposals currently circulating, it would not compel NATO to surrender some of its best assets

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in the maintenance of the deterrent and the protection of Western Europe. In this connection, the knowledge which the Soviets could gain of our deployments in Western Germany would probably not represent any significant loss on our side in view of their present ability to gain such knowledge by clandestine and other means.

The proposal is not tied to the reunification of Germany and would therefore present a special problem vis a vis the Germans. It could not be presented as making any immediate contribution toward reunification, but it can be honestly depicted as only the first step in the direction of an eventual European settlement which will necessarily include a restored Germany. It may be worth considering an expansion of the inspection area to include one or more NATO countries in addition to the German Federal Republic so as to allay any misapprehensions on this score; the Netherlands and Belgium come to mind in this connection. The device of mixed teams on both sides of the line should also help to meet this problem. In fact, the successful operation of the system should lead to some increase in mutual trust, therefore to some relaxation of international tensions, and therefore to further steps in the direction of comprehensive and effective control and reduction of armaments. The proposal along the lines sketched might well be accompanied by a statement to the effect that the system proposed could lead to an increase in understanding which could result in broadening the scope of inspection in order to relate it to the enforcement of subsequently agreed limitations on forces and armaments, either in connection with a general disarmament agreement or in connection with a regional security agreement linked to the solution of political problems such as the reunification of Germany.

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In public presentation of this proposal for inspection and control, we could obtain a maximum favorable result by stressing that the fears of mankind and the feelings of insecurity generated by these fears stem in large measure from ignorance of the facts in a given situation. An arrangement for the establishment of what are essentially fact-finding teams in an area of great international sensitivity not only will help to abate tensions in that area itself, but by bringing certain basic facts to the attention of governments and peoples would provide a foundation for agreements of a more far-reaching nature.